Nigeria is seen clearly weaning away from Chinese made military junk

In early December, officials from Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) announced that they were in contact with Nigerian emissaries regarding the possible acquisition of Tejas light fighters by the African country.

This news underlines the close ties between the two countries, and the development of the Indian defence industry as well as Abuja’s need for modern equipment to cope with the deteriorating security situation in its neighbourhood. However, if the Nigerian air force were to opt for the Tejas fighter, it would present a rather strange situation, illustrating the non-alignment of the countries of the South: Abuja already uses three JF-17 Thunders, of Pakistani/Chinese origin. The fact that it didn’t bring more units into its inventory with the TEJAS in mind, with all that this implies, could possibly reveal a possible lack of happiness about the Thunder’s performance.

However, this does not prevent Nigeria from relying on a fleet of Chinese unmanned assets (CH-3, CH-4 and Wing Loong II UAVs) to carry out its military operations.

Military relations between the two countries, which are both former British colonies, go back a long way, with New Delhi helping to establish the Nigerian Defence Academy and Naval College in the early 1960s. This partnership was strengthened in 2007, when the two countries signed a Memorandum of Understanding to structure their defence cooperation. This led to joint military training, an exchange programme and the joint deployment of forces for UN peacekeeping operations.

Exchanges of best practice and discussions have also taken place in the field of counter-terrorism, most recently in 2021, at a time when jihadist attacks were affecting both countries. During the 2010s, five joint defence coordination committees were set up, a dynamic that the COVID pandemic seems to have slowed down. This did not prevent the Indian frigate INS Tarkash from visiting Lagos in 2022 to launch a joint counter-piracy operation in the Gulf of Guinea.

This mission was also a strong signal of India’s geopolitical ambition. India imports between 8% and 10% of its crude oil from Nigeria every year and is therefore willing to give security guarantees. Still heavily dependent on oil imports to fuel its economy, the fact that India now has the means and the will to send ships far from its traditional theatre of operations is a sign of its efforts to secure its supply routes by its own means.

Global anti-piracy and force projection operations have long been the prerogative of Western states, later imitated by China to establish itself as one of the structuring powers of the world order. A status India is now aiming to reach, in its own way.